A Failed Peace Process
By Shailendra Aima
The Mumbai Attack is an attack on the very idea of India" said Prime Minister Manmohan Singh while addressing the Parliament. Similar sentiments were expressed in 2001 when the Indian Parliament was attacked and also in 1999 during the Kargil incursion by Pakistanis leading to a war between India and Pakistan. The state of Pakistan has always been prompt to deny its role and complicity. But what makes India forgive and forget is a question that has bewildered the people. Is it magnanimity or lack of will to root out a scourge? None can comprehend that a billion people backed by more than a million strong military and the economic and strategic hardware far superior to a failing rogue neigbour, is meek enough to respond in dignity and with determination.
Even in the case of Kargil, where the army intelligence was caught napping, the political leadership did not give a free hand to the army to dislodge the intruders. Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister had clear orders for the troops, "Don't cross the LOC." It was not easy as it was made out; it took more time than first thought and it was a bloody battle where more men were lost. The Pakistanis were well entrenched, well-equipped and they had the invaluable strategic advantage of being on heights.
After the December 13 attack on the Parliament, the troops were deployed along the borders for more than ten months. But while the government projected this as a bloodless operation, the figures of casualties suggest that this was a war, which had its human costs and more than 680 soldiers were killed during Operation Parakram.
Problems with India's military doctrine and a lack of clarity within the Union Cabinet and on its war objectives may have undermined Operation Parakram at the very outset. Significant military gains could have been achieved in January 2002, had politicians made the decision to go to war. "These objectives could have included "degradation of the other force, and perhaps the capture of disputed territory in Jammu and Kashmir. They were more achievable in January, less achievable in February, and even less achievable in March. By then, the balance of forces had gradually changed." The strategic experts have also argued that air strikes against terror training camps could have been carried out within days of the December 13 outrage.
From a strategic military and political objective, these conflagrations failed to demoralize, deter and disrupt the enemy. Strategic analysts felt that General Musharraf was the textbook insurgent. He disliked meeting an adversary in the field and he would use deception to avoid this. The ease with which Musharraf deceived the West seemed a sign of terrible things to come. It was also generally accepted in India that Musharraf would not relinquish the use of terror in the pursuit of Pakistani security goals. Yet on the contrary, the Indian state went on a peace trip with the enemy.
On April 19, 2003, addressing a press conference at the Srinagar airport before leaving for Delhi, Vajpayee said that it would be in the interests of India and Pakistan to sort out their differences through talks. "We are willing to discuss all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. But the route of cross-border terrorism cannot go on. There has been no benefit from it and there cannot be any benefit in future."
On April 23, 2003 in his first comment on Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's fresh offer of friendship to Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf expressed hope that these indications 'can be pursued to greater interacting process', and that Pakistan was prepared to engage in a comprehensive dialogue with India on Kashmir and other outstanding disputes. He also said that Kashmir had been the main impediment to the development of normal relations between the two countries.
On April 29, 2003 the Indian Army said that infiltration of terrorists from across the border was still continuing and that there would be no let up in counterinsurgency operations. Chief of Army Staff General N C Vij asserted that his troops were ready to face any eventuality. He, however, refused to comment on latest developments at the political level between the two countries, including the telephonic talk between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Mir Zafarullah Jamali on Monday evening.
On the same day, Pakistani Media quoted Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat reporting that Pakistan would take action against terrorist outfits that have resurfaced with new names. "... the government is responsible to ensure rule of law and would go for it at any cost. We are committed to purge our society of terrorism and our every action must speak of our resolve. We must remain vigilant of hidden, internal or external hand and should not give any room to anti-state elements to use our soil."
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf had, in January 2002, banned five terrorist outfits, including the Jaish-e-Mohammed, blamed for the attack on Indian Parliament, and the Lashkar-e-Tayiba. Another terrorist group, the Harkat-ul-Ansar, was also banned later.
Since 2003, India and Pakistan have carried on with this process of peace that many in India and across the world have believed to be the Peace Offensive from Pakistan. The terrorists attacks* have gone on unabated since then.
The nature and magnitude of the Bombay attack is a grim reminder that the war unleashed by Islamic fundamentalists is both ruthless and relentless, and is far from being over. The peace process with Pakistan started by the NDA regime and pursued by UPA Government has only served as an exercise in self delusion. And Pakistan which is an epicenter of this terror seems an accomplice to these crimes.
In fact, the Mumbai attack has lead to mass anger and people every where are questioning the very logic of the peace process. The common refrain today is that the peace process is primarily disruptive as it has only diverted attention from the real issues; given legitimacy to a rogue state; and prevented system overhaul against terrorism.
An argument that there is a need to make a distinction between Pakistani State and Pakistani Military and ISI is no more being bought by the public angst against Pakistan as well as the Indian establishment. In fact, the diplomatic pressure against Pakistan and the UN censure of Pakistan and banning of Jamat-Ud-Dawa have hardly yielded any tangible results on the ground and the Pakistani Government is still crying hoarse for proof against the alleged terrorist organizations.
The reality which the Indian state, especially during the BJP lead NDA regime, desperately tried to overlook in search of settling issues with Pakistan has suddenly been catapulted to the hazy horizon of Indo-Pak peace initiative – can a democratic, secular and pluralistic India coexist with an Ideological State of Pakistan? "The fact is that two-nation theory and Pakistan are the same. All other States except Pakistan have been created on the basis of geography, ethnicity and economic interests. This is the uniqueness of Pakistan." In fact, Muslims who carved out an exclusive Islamic entity in the name of Pakistan believe in Jehad as an instrumentality of politics and Justice.
Lashkar-e-Taiba, noted Pakistani diplomat and journalist Hussain Haqqani explains, is a jihadi group of Wahhabi persuasion, "backed by Saudi money and protected by Pakistani intelligence services." He notes that "Lashkar-e-Taiba has adopted a maximalist agenda for global jihad." Indeed, the political arm of the group has conveniently published a pamphlet, "Why Are We Waging Jihad?" that lays out all kinds of reasons why the United States, Israel and India are "existential enemies of Islam." Haqqani Ilists eight reasons for Jihad: 1) to eliminate evil and facilitate conversion to and practice of Islam; 2) to ensure the ascendancy of Islam; 3) to force non-Muslims to pay jizya (poll tax, paid by non-Muslims for protection from a Muslim ruler); 4) to assist the weak and powerless; 5) to avenge the blood of Muslims killed by unbelievers; 6) to punish enemies for breaking promises and treaties; 7) to defend a Muslim state; and 8) to liberate Muslim territories under non-Muslim occupation.
There has been a ground swell for Jehad in Pakistan. Pakistani Military, Mullah and Militant combine thus operates with impunity, calls shots and maintains deniability by way of projecting the democratic government as weak and unable to control the non-state actors and the ungoverned areas. There is an opinion decrying the necessity to strengthen the weakling state of Pakistan which has failed to move against the terror operatives with desirable action. The peace makers would also like India to continue efforts in making peace overtures and continue vacillations on waging a war on the terrorists and be punitive to a rogue nation.
It shall have to be accepted that the peace process never took off. It remained a subterfuge and a charade in which the Pakistani state as well as its so-called non-state actors kept alive their deception and blackmailed India into accepting Kashmir as a bilateral or a trilateral dispute for settling for peace with Pakistan. Sooner we call this bluff, better for our own security and integrity. Else, India has already moved ahead towards a compromise on its sovereignty and might move further into its own disintegration. The ideology of Pakistan, of secession in J&K and of Jehad is synonymous and need be dealt with effectively.
